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ABSTRACT
Qualified immunity has no perfect solution. On one hand, qualified
immunity can prevent individuals whose civil rights have been violated
from receiving monetary compensation—obviously, a bad outcome. On
the other hand, without qualified immunity, government officials who
fear liability may hold back from protecting the public—another bad
outcome. Qualified immunity seeks to strike a balance between those bad
outcomes: Plaintiffs can recover damages only if a government official
violated clearly established law. Some individuals thus will have their
rights violated but receive no compensation, while other individuals may
be harmed because the government does not come to their aid. Qualified
immunity’s goal, however, should be to produce an outcome that is best
for the public overall. Whether qualified immunity strikes the right
balance is a topic of intense debate, which intensified following the
killing of George Floyd and subsequent public protests in the summer of
2020. Many scholars, judges, and policymakers have since urged a
rebalancing. Some even call for qualified immunity to be eliminated
altogether. Others counter, however, that reforming qualified immunity
will do more harm than good.
In our contribution to this symposium on the future of qualified
immunity, we offer a partial path forward. Regardless of whether
qualified immunity is reformed at the federal level, states have acted and
can further act as laboratories of democracy to experiment with different
balances. To illustrate the benefits of this approach, we identify reforms
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to qualified immunity that have been proposed at the federal level to
demonstrate how they could be applied at the state level. We also expand
the conversation by identifying other potential civil-rights litigation
reforms that could be implemented in the states, including changes
related to (i) pleading standards; (ii) anti-stagnation rules; and
(iii) availability of appellate review. Although state-led reform is not a
panacea, 51 imperfect solutions may be better than one imperfect
solution.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has admitted that qualified immunity will
always be imperfect because it is targeted at a problem for which there
can be no perfect solution. On one hand, “an action for damages may
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees.”1 But on the other hand, “claims frequently run against the
innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant
officials, but to society as a whole,” as “fear of being sued [may]
‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their
1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
506 (1978)).
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duties.’”2 Neither outcome is good. Hence, “resolution of immunity
questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in
any available alternative.”3 There can be no perfect solution—i.e., an
outcome with no downside—when any balance involves allowing some
evil. Instead, per the Court’s account, the best the legal system can do
is to try to strike the optimal balance.
Efforts to strike balances often tend to attract controversy.4 But in
the context of qualified immunity, striking a balance is especially
controversial because the stakes are exceptionally high, the issues are
deeply personal, and there is a great deal of empirical uncertainty and
disagreement about how “civil-rights ecosystems”5 and policing
dynamics work.6 Especially in the wake of the tragic killing of George
Floyd and the subsequent public protests in the summer of 2020,7 it is
unsurprising that an increasing number of scholars and commentators
argue that qualified immunity’s balance is too heavily tilted in favor of
immunity. Indeed, numerous litigants have called on the Supreme
Court to overrule or curtail qualified immunity, thus far unsuccessfully,
on the theory that Congress never authorized qualified immunity and
that it produces unjust outcomes.8 Likewise, on the legislative front,
2. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
3. Id. at 813.
4. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J.
1289, 1325 (2011) (“There is something philosophically unsatisfying about a balancing test that
involves balancing two incommensurable things: burdens on an individual right, and interests of
the state or polity.”).
5. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (2020)
(describing the paradoxical nature of the relationship between the number of successful lawsuits
filed against urban police departments and the frequency and severity of police misconduct).
6. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Qualified Immunity and
Federalism, 109 GEO. L.J. 229, 283 n.310, 303 (2020) (identifying empirical disagreement about
the effects of qualified immunity). For a thoughtful response, see generally Joanna C. Schwartz,
Qualified Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down, 109 GEO. L.J. 305 (2020) (arguing that
qualified immunity does not serve federalism values).
7. See, e.g., Holly Bailey, Derek Chauvin Sentenced to 22½ Years in Prison for the Murder
POST
(June
25,
2021),
of
George
Floyd,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/06/25/derek-chauvin-sentencing-george-floyd/.
8. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 231–32 (describing numerous instances of courts
attacking the doctrine of qualified immunity on the ground that has not been authorized by
Congress). We have argued that under traditional principles of stare decisis, the Supreme Court
is not the right body to overhaul qualified immunity. See generally Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853 (2018). Thus far, the Supreme Court appears to agree, as it has repeatedly rejected calls to
do just that. Cf. Daniel T. Higgins II, The Battle Over Qualified Immunity, 45 OKLA. CITY U.L.
REV. 37, 49 (2020) (“[T]he Court, considering stare decisis principles, is hard-pressed to make
further changes to the doctrine” of qualified immunity.); Gerard Magliocca, Qualified Immunity
and Stare Decisis, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 27, 2019) (“Stare decisis, the Court has told us a million
times, is at its apex in statutory cases. Qualified immunity, for better or worse, is an interpretation
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some policymakers have proposed to eliminate qualified immunity, or
at least to narrow it in significant ways.9 It is doubtful that qualified
immunity has ever before received so much attention.
As the nation debates what to do with qualified immunity, we offer
a partial path forward: federalism. Elsewhere, we have urged that
federalism considerations should play a role in how we think about
qualified immunity in at least three respects: (i) how courts interpret
Section 1983,10 the primary federal cause of action that plaintiffs use to
sue state and local officials for monetary damages; (ii) how the U.S.
Supreme Court should evaluate stare decisis, given the fact that state
and local governments have arranged their internal affairs and entered
into financial obligation against the backdrop of dozens of Supreme
Court decisions recognizing limits on liability; and (iii) which level of
government (federal versus state) is best positioned to reform qualified
immunity.11
In this Essay, we elaborate on that third point.12 In our view, rather
than focusing on a single imperfect solution—viz., one federal standard
for the entire nation—the better course includes pursuing 51 (or more)
imperfect solutions.13 State and local governments can strike their own
balances between vindicating rights and chilling beneficial
governmental action. Nothing prevents state governments from
creating their own causes of action to enforce rights that mirror federal
rights but with defenses that do not mirror federal defenses.14 To be
of Acts of Congress.”). We have also explained, however, that that does not mean that legislators
should not consider reforming qualified immunity. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 302–
03.
9. See Part II.A infra (describing three recent legislative proposals attempting to reform or
eliminate qualified immunity).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983 creates the primary federal cause of action that plaintiffs
use to sue state and local officials for monetary damages).
11. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 234–38 (arguing in favor of using federalism to
protect the ability of states to make decisions regarding qualified immunity reforms). Since our
article was published, a trio of scholars has reached a similar conclusion about the power of
federalism to address such issues. See generally James E. Pfander, Alex Reinert & Joanna C.
Schwartz, New Federalism and Civil Rights Enforcement, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 745 (2021)
(arguing state and local officials should not rely on the possibility of federal-level reforms
regarding qualified immunity but should instead make legal and policy changes themselves at the
local level).
12. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 294 (arguing that Congress, not the federal
courts, should reform qualified immunity legislation at the federal level, because it is best suited
to consider each states’ reliance interests).
13. As evident by its title, this Essay is inspired by JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT
SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
14. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 294 (finding, in fact, one of the benefits of
federalism allows states to experiment with how each individually makes reforms to qualified
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sure, federal law provides a floor; when an official violates clearly
established law, a plaintiff can receive damages because qualified
immunity does not apply, but federal law does not provide a ceiling;
states are free to create additional liability.15 State law thus can be “a
font of individual liberties, [with] protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”16
Importantly, this “51 imperfect solutions” approach to reforming
qualified immunity is not just hypothetical. Some states have begun to
fundamentally change the liability rules for police officers within their
borders.17 For decades, other jurisdictions have imposed state-specific
limitations on the defenses that state and local officers can raise in civilrights litigation.18 Although this reality is often overlooked in qualified
immunity debates, it should be at the forefront. Not only can a 51
imperfect solutions approach be implemented quicker and easier than
national reform, it can also be better reform. In our federal system,
different states can pursue different policy paths tailored to their
unique circumstances, which, in turn, allows for greater
experimentation.19
To illustrate this point more concretely, Part II of this Essay
addresses a number of reforms that have been proposed at the federal
level. Rather than evaluating them as federal solutions, however, we
consider how such proposals could work at the state level. Our
conclusion is that once a state has a state analogue to Section 1983, all
immunity defenses and liability); accord Pfander et al., supra note 11, at 768 (arguing that “state
and local legislatures can enact a statutory analogue to Section 1983 that does not allow a qualified
immunity defense, imposes vicarious liability, and mandates indemnification”).
15. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 295 (arguing in favor of states treating federal
law as the floor and enacting additional remedies for their citizens).
16. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
17. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 297 (explaining various approaches taken by
several states to expand liability for officers beyond what is required by federal law); Justice
Cannot Be “Qualified”, 57 TR. MAG. 46, 50 (Dec. 2021) (“Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and New Mexico have taken noteworthy steps toward eliminating qualified immunity for
violations of state civil rights laws and providing increased accountability for unlawful police
actions by limiting officer immunity from civil suits due to misconduct. Colorado’s law is
considered a model, offering a window into what a comprehensive approach to police reform
looks like.”).
18. See, e.g., Pfander et al., supra note 11, at 740–42 (finding several state legislatures have
barred officers from raising qualified immunity defenses in cases involving violations of the state’s
constitution).
19. Nielson & Walker, supra note 6 at 237; see also Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221
(2011) (“[Federalism] allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the
initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to
rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power.”).
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of these reform proposals for qualified immunity could be on the table
for implementation.
Moving beyond what has been proposed to date, Part III then
identifies other reform ideas relevant to qualified immunity that can be
tested through a 51 imperfect solutions approach.20 For example, civilrights plaintiffs in federal court must satisfy the Iqbal pleading
standard, which requires that allegations be “plausible” before a court
will allow discovery.21 There is an ongoing debate over whether this
pleading standard prevents injured civil-rights plaintiffs from obtaining
compensation.22 States, however, are free to disregard Iqbal and apply
their own pleading standards, either generally or for civil-claims
specifically. Similarly, scholars have long debated whether qualified
immunity’s procedural rules lead to “stagnation,”23 as judges may
dismiss claims on the ground that the alleged right is not clearly
established without first determining whether the right exists, thus
potentially preventing new rights from emerging.24 States, however, can
strike a different balance. Finally, the longstanding federal appellate
principle that officers who have been denied qualified immunity may
immediately appeal rather than having to wait for a final judgment25
has also come under criticism in recent years.26 Once more, states are
free to experiment.
These are not the only areas in which state experimentation is
possible, but they make the point: State and local governments have a
great deal of flexibility in balancing competing concerns in civil-rights
cases. Rather than just addressing qualified immunity in one fell,
federal swoop, the time has come to explore 51 imperfect solutions.

20. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
21. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”).
22. See Part III.A infra (explaining that some scholars argue the federal pleading standard
is difficult for civil-rights plaintiffs to meet).
23. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009) (overruling the mandatory nature
of a prior two-prong test to allow for federal district courts and courts of appeals more discretion
in determining whether a constitutional right exists during their analysis of qualified immunity).
24. See Part III.B infra (arguing state legislatures can create their own procedural rules to
apply to qualified immunity cases to prevent stagnation).
25. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
26. See Part III.C infra (explaining some commentators believe this principle can give
defendants unfair leverage during the settlement process).
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UNDERSTANDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND FEDERALISM

Qualified immunity has always been a divisive issue27—yet it has
become especially contentious in recent years. Here, we do not
document the ins and outs of the longstanding debate, nor the details
of the defense.28 For purposes of this Essay, we assume familiarity with
the basics. The key point is that Section 1983 has been broadly
interpreted to allow civil-rights suits for damages against state and local
officers in their personal capacities, but those officers also enjoy a
qualified immunity defense to such suits: damages are not available
unless the officers violated a right that was “clearly established” at the
time of the alleged violation.29
To be clearly established, the right “must be clear enough that every
reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the
plaintiff seeks to apply” as applied to “the particular circumstances” of
the case.30 This standard often, though not always,31 requires precedent
with a similar factual situation.32 The upshot is that sometimes a
constitutional violation will go without a Section 1983 monetary
remedy, on the theory that the prospect of liability for making a mistake
about what the law requires may dissuade officers from faithfully
executing state and local laws and policies that do not violate the U.S.
Constitution.33
Scholars debate whether qualified immunity is good law34 and
27. See, e.g., Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New
Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 905 (1984)
(“Because Harlow has the potential to broaden dramatically the protection that the qualified
immunity defense affords to public officials, it could undermine the significance of section 1983.”).
28. We have done that elsewhere. See, e.g., Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 238–50
(detailing the history of qualified immunity and recent criticisms).
29. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (explaining the
doctrine that “[the] legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing
precedent” in addition to being clearly established).
30. Id. at 590.
31. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.”); see also id. at 745 (“Hope
was treated in a way antithetical to human dignity—he was hitched to a post for an extended
period of time in a position that was painful, and under circumstances that were both degrading
and dangerous.”).
32. See City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015) (“Qualified
immunity is no immunity at all if ‘clearly established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742
(2011) (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level
of generality.”).
33. Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 291–92.
34. The leading criticism of qualified immunity’s lawfulness is William Baude, Is Qualified
Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018). Since that article was published, several
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whether it is good policy35—which is not the same question. Our most
recent contribution to those debates is Qualified Immunity and
Federalism.36 There, we argue that federalism is highly relevant to the
legal question of whether the Supreme Court should revisit qualified
immunity, especially in light of statutory stare decisis and the significant
amount of reliance the Supreme Court’s decades of cases recognizing
qualified immunity have encouraged.37 But we also observe that
federalism has a role to play in assessing qualified immunity’s policy
implications. After all, state governments can create liability for their
own officers much higher than the federal floor. To do so, all a state
must do is create a cause of action that mirrors Section 1983’s
substantive scope, but with different defenses.38 In this way, state
governments can raise the floor of federal qualified immunity by
eliminating qualified immunity under state law for certain claims—or
at least making it easier for officers to be held liable for monetary
damages.39 Indeed, “[h]istory is . . . replete with examples of states
enacting laws to protect individual rights in response to federal
inaction.”40

counterarguments have been offered. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to
Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933 (2019) (criticizing recent expansions of qualified
immunity); Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV.
1337 (2021) (arguing in favor of restoring certain 19th-century features of qualified immunity to
address modern issues).
35. The most comprehensive criticism of qualified immunity as policy comes from Joanna
Schwartz in a series of articles. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127
YALE L.J. 2 (2017). Her views challenge the Supreme Court’s claims about how qualified
immunity works as empirically untrue. But see Nielson & Walker, supra note 8, at 1876 (arguing
these empirical studies do not necessarily provide support for the Court’s reconsideration of
qualified immunity).
36. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 291–92 (arguing that the Constitution does not
require Congress to create a cause of action against officers, particularly in cases where officers
made good-faith mistakes).
37. Id. at 282–85.
38. See id. at 296 (arguing federal qualified immunity standards set a minimum standard that
can be expanded by states).
39. Id.
40. Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights
of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1377 (2005). For example, although states are protected by
sovereign immunity, they “are free to waive their immunity from suit under federal statutory law,”
as some have done. Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 296 (quoting Lauren K. Robel, Sovereignty
and Democracy: The States’ Obligations to Their Citizens Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND.
L.J. 543, 543 (2003)). Likewise, although state and local governments are not generally required
to protect individuals from the actions of third parties, they are free to impose such obligations
on themselves, as some have done. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S 189, 202 (1989) (holding that “the State had no constitutional duty to protect” the petitioner
from an abusive parent); see also Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure
to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
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As we document in Qualified Immunity and Federalism, this is not
just a hypothetical power when it comes to qualified immunity; states
already do this. California, for example, has decreed that qualified
immunity “‘does not extend to state tort claims against government
employees’” or to certain “state civil rights claims.”41 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit has held that for such claims, “qualified immunity is a doctrine
of federal common law and, as such, has no application to . . . state
claims, which are subject only to state statutory immunities.”42 Instead
of mirroring federal law, California has created “state statutory
immunities”43 that are tailored to certain types of claims but not to
others.44 California is not alone in this. A recent study documents the
diversity of state approaches to government official liability and
qualified immunity—including statutory frameworks for civil rights
actions against government employees, budgetary frameworks for
indemnifying employees, compensating victims, state and local
government litigation practices, and procedures for handling civil rights
lawsuits.45 There are clear examples of states, by statute or judicial
decision, embracing a state qualified immunity doctrine that differs
from the federal qualified immunity doctrine.46
This diversity of approaches is a good thing. Indeed, it is a realworld example of one of the central benefits of our federal system.
Because states are not required to operate in lockstep, they have
freedom to create “local policies ‘more sensitive to the diverse needs
of a heterogeneous society,’” which encourages “‘innovation and
experimentation,’ enables greater citizen ‘involvement in democratic
processes,’ and makes government ‘more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.’”47 At the same time, states

Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393, 1422 (1990) (“DeShaney endorsed state tort law as a legal
avenue for plaintiffs injured by state officers’ failure to protect when under a state-imposed duty
to do so.”).
41. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of
L.A., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230 (2007)).
42. Id. (emphasis in original).
43. Id. (emphasis in original).
44. See id. at 1071 (citing Sullivan v. County of L.A., 527 P.2d 865, 867–72 (Cal. 1974))
(describing how no California immunity provisions “appl[y] to a false imprisonment claim
brought pursuant to California Government Code § 821.6”).
45. See Pfander et al., supra note 11, at 758–63 (summarizing findings on alternative
approaches to Section 1983 claims at state and local levels).
46. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 296–300 (describing the various approaches to
qualified immunity in several different states).
47. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991)).
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cannot go too far in limiting compensation. If they attempt to allow
officials to violate clearly established rights, plaintiffs may simply bring
suit under Section 1983. In this way, Section 1983 operates as a floor,
not a ceiling—meaning states are free to strike a different balance
above the federal floor.48 There is a significant difference between
saying “this is the standard for damages in civil-rights cases” and,
instead, saying “this is the floor for potential damages in civil-rights
cases, but states can go above this floor.”
II. LEGISLATING AWAY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In the summer of 2020, after the killing of George Floyd and
subsequent public outcry, the 116th Congress considered various
legislative proposals to reform qualified immunity.49 None became law.
This Part surveys some of the main federal proposals to demonstrate
how they could in theory be implemented at the state level. In so doing,
we rely on the recent work of James Pfander, Alex Reinert, and Joanna
Schwartz, which advocates for states to “enact a state law analogue to
Section 1983 that allows people to bring an action under state law for
the violation of their state and/or federal constitutional rights.”50
To be sure, their proposed state model statute would eliminate
qualified immunity entirely, as well as impose vicarious liability on local
governments for employees’ actions, mandate indemnification of
government employees (and prohibit indemnification caps), and codify
an attorney fee-shifting regime similar to the federal statutory
scheme.51 In this short Essay we do not endeavor to assess this more
comprehensive and sweeping reform. Nor do we offer
recommendations about which reforms (if any) make the most sense
generally or in particular cases. Instead, our goal is to illustrate how the
federal proposals to date could be implemented at the state level
should a state wish to do so. Part II.A focuses on the three main
legislative proposals introduced in the 116th Congress. Part II.B then
assesses three narrower alternatives that states could also consider.

48. Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 299.
49. See, e.g., George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020). Part II
substantially draws from and builds on Christopher J. Walker, Legislating Away Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 24, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/legislating-away-qualified-immunity-in-section-1983/.
50. Pfander et al., supra note 11, at 769; see also id. at 769–75 (discussing the various features
of the authors’ proposed model state statute in greater detail).
51. Id. at 33–34.
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We discuss them in the order of the magnitude of change the reform
would make to existing doctrine.
A. Proposed Legislation in the 116th Congress
1. Amash–Pressley Ending Qualified Immunity Act
Representatives Justin Amash (L-Mich.) and Ayanna Pressley (DMass.) proposed the Ending Qualified Immunity Act.52 This legislation
would create a broad and unambiguous elimination of qualified
immunity or any sort of related good faith defense under Section 1983,
by adding the following to the end of Section 1983:
It shall not be a defense or immunity to any action brought
under this section that the defendant was acting in good faith,
or that the defendant believed, reasonably or otherwise, that
his or her conduct was lawful at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall it be a defense or immunity that the
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws were not clearly established at the time of their
deprivation by the defendant, or that the state of the law was
otherwise such that the defendant could not reasonably have
been expected to know whether his or her conduct was
lawful.53

Indeed, this proposed language seems broad enough to allow for
monetary damages even when an officer follows binding circuit-court
or Supreme Court precedent that is later overturned as well as for
officers who follow state law that is later deemed unlawful under
federal law.
The Amash–Pressley proposal faces significant barriers to
garnering bipartisan support at the federal level. Among other things,
eliminating qualified immunity has the potential to impose substantial
economic and other costs on state and local governments, which by
state law, municipal ordinance, or employment contract defend and
indemnify officers for monetary liability under Section 1983.54 Many
members of Congress may worry about the financial implications of
such sweeping reform for their states and localities, and even more so
in the COVID-19 era when state and local government budgets have
been decimated. Likewise, the potential unfairness inherent in

52. H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020).
53. Id. § 4 (to amend 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
54. For more on these concerns, see Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 263–93.
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imposing liability even when an official has followed existing precedent
may be a heavy lift politically. That said, not all states and localities are
the same, and such experimentation at the state or local level of this
breadth may be more possible.
2. The Braun Reforming Qualified Immunity Act
Senator Mike Braun (R-Ind.) introduced the Reforming Qualified
Immunity Act.55 Like the Amash–Pressley bill, the Braun proposal
would broadly eliminate qualified immunity under Section 1983, but it
would carve out two potentially important exceptions to address the
concerns raised above. Jay Schweikert aptly summarizes these two
exceptions:
a.

If the defendant could show that, at the time they were
alleged to have violated someone’s rights, (1) their
challenged conduct was specifically authorized by a
federal or state statute, or federal regulation, (2) no
court had held that this statute or regulation was
unconstitutional, and (3) they had a reasonable, goodfaith belief that their actions were lawful.

b. If the defendant could show that, at the time they were
alleged to have violated someone’s rights, (1) their
challenged conduct was specifically authorized by
then-applicable judicial precedent, and (2) they had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that their actions were
lawful.56

These exceptions from monetary liability for state and local
government officers will likely need to be included in any proposed
legislation that has a chance of garnering bipartisan support at the
federal level.57 Particularly relevant to this Essay, these exceptions may
also make qualified immunity reform at the state level more realistic
because the law would not impose monetary liability when officers
followed federal law or binding judicial precedent. One could imagine
some state legislatures expanding the first exception to include both
state statutes and regulations to mirror the federal law exception. Some
may well also include local ordinances in that exception.

55. S. 4036, 116th Cong. (2020).
56. Jay Schweikert, Republican Senator Introduces Legislation To Reform Qualified
Immunity, CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (June 23, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/
republican-senator-introduces-legislation-reform-qualified-immunity.
57. See Part II.A.1 supra.
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States may also expressly note that the second exception applies to
both federal and state judicial precedents.
3. Democrats’ Justice in Policing Act
Another qualified immunity reform legislation of the 116th
Congress was included in the larger Justice in Policing Act, which was
advanced by Democrats in the House and Senate.58 In June 2020, the
House passed this bill on a 236-181 vote, with all Democrats and three
Republicans voting in favor.59 This legislation would only eliminate
qualified immunity for law enforcement officers, as opposed to every
person acting under the color of state or local law.60 In other words, it
would not eliminate qualified immunity for other state and local
officials, such as public school teachers, social workers, and other
government employees who are not involved in “the prevention,
detection, or investigation of any violation of criminal law.”61
This legislative proposal responds to current calls for police reform.
It is thus not surprising that at least two states have adopted this
approach. In 2020, the Colorado legislature enacted a statute that
created a state cause of action against a “peace officer” for state
constitutional violations and expressly stated that “[q]ualified
immunity is not a defense to liability.”62 In 2021, New Mexico passed a
similar law.63
To be clear, even this proposal focused solely on law enforcement
would still be a dramatic change to existing law, which could potentially
impose significant costs on state and local governments that generally
indemnify their employees in Section 1983 actions. Many states would
58. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020); Justice in Policing
Act, S. 3912, 116th Cong. (2020).
59. Roll Call 119: Bill Number: H.R. 7120, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES (June 25, 2020, 8:39 PM), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2020119.
60. H.R. 7120 § 102 (“It shall not be a defense or immunity in any action brought under [42
U.S.C. § 1983] against a local law enforcement officer (as such term is defined in section 2 of the
George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020), or in any action under any source of law against a
Federal investigative or law enforcement officer . . . .”).
61. See id. at § 2(6) (defining “local law enforcement officer” as “any officer, agent, or
employee of a State or unit of local government authorized by law or by a government agency to
engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, or investigation of any violation of criminal
law”).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(1), (2)(b). Colorado law defines “peace officer” to
include “any person employed by a political subdivision of the state required to be certified by
the P.O.S.T. board pursuant to section 16-2.5-102, a Colorado state patrol officer as described in
section 16-2.5-114, and any noncertified deputy sheriff as described in section 16-2.5-103(2).” Id.
§ 24-31-901(3).
63. New Mexico Civil Rights Act of 2021, N.M. STAT. § 41-4A-1 et seq.
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no doubt also want to consider including the Braun proposal’s
exceptions discussed in Part II.A.2. We do not intend to enter the policy
debate of weighing the costs and benefits of this proposed reform. That
said, now that Colorado and New Mexico have enacted a similar regime
under state law, comparisons can more easily be drawn between
different states to attempt to more fully understand the costs and
benefits of a law-enforcement exception to qualified immunity.
B. Other Narrower Potential Legislative Reforms
States can also consider other options beyond what members of
Congress have proposed. Here, we identify three alternatives. These
options are illustrative, and we do not seek to weigh in on their merits.
But they should help illustrate the types of reforms states can consider.
1. Exclude Qualified Immunity for Excessive Force
To begin, states could focus on the constitutional violation or
conduct at issue, instead of the officer. Limiting the elimination of
qualified immunity to a subset of conduct like excessive force—instead
of all conduct by a particular set of state actors—would allow law
enforcement officers to have qualified immunity for other difficult
decisions they have to make in the line of duty. In so doing, it would
also limit somewhat the potential liability state and local governments
would assume through indemnification.
At the same time, this revision would apply more broadly than the
Justice in Policing Act to eliminate qualified immunity for any state
actor who exercises excessive force, not just police officers. This sort of
approach would seem more consistent with how absolute immunity
works in the context of legislative and judicial actions, where the focus
is not on the state actor’s title or position (legislator or judge), but
instead on the state action at issue (the exercise of legislative or judicial
functions).64
Here’s what that legislation could look like:
a.

State law is amended by adding the following
provision: “It shall not be a defense or immunity to
any action brought under this section for claims of

64. See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49, 54 (1998) (extending absolute immunity
for “legislative activities” under Section 1983 beyond state legislators to local legislators); see also
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (reaffirming absolute immunity for judges under
Section 1983 for “their judicial acts”) and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976) (“The
common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the
common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.”).
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excessive force under the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution or the state-law equivalent that—the
defendant was acting in good faith, or that the
defendant believed, reasonably or otherwise, that his
or her conduct was lawful at the time when the
conduct was committed; or
b. the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws were not clearly established at
the time of their deprivation by the defendant, or that
at that time, the state of the law was otherwise such
that the defendant could not reasonably have been
expected to know whether his or her conduct was
lawful.”

To broaden this exception to any Fourth Amendment claim—
including both excessive force and unreasonable searches and seizures
more generally—legislators could simply delete the words “of
excessive force” from the first sentence. If a state legislature wanted to
narrow the coverage to just deadly force, the language could read “any
action brought under this section for wrongful death based on claims
of excessive force . . . .” A legislature may wish to include the Braun
exceptions, discussed in Part II.A.2.
Modifying Section 1983 to depart from the general rules for certain
claims is not unprecedented. For example, in the federal system, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) carves out claims “brought with
respect to prison condition under section 1983” for special treatment—
albeit in ways that make it harder for prisoner plaintiffs to prevail.65 The
California legislature has taken a related claim-specific approach to
immunity, providing for immunity for some state actions but not for
others.66 And similarly, the Washington Supreme Court has held that
state qualified immunity is not “available for claims of assault and
battery arising out of the use of excessive force to effectuate an
arrest.”67

65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
66. See, e.g., Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1246 (2007) (finding
no immunity for unreasonable searches while noting other California statutory provisions,
including CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b)(1), that provide immunities for unlawful arrest).
67. Staats v. Brown, 991 P.2d 615, 627–28 (Wash. 2000).
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2. Reestablish Subjective Intent Standard
The elimination of qualified immunity for excessive force claims
may be too broad a reform to garner sufficient legislative support in
most states, especially given such reform’s potential effect on state and
local government budgets and the fact that state and local officials
would be liable for good-faith mistakes.68 A narrower reform would be
to strip officers of qualified immunity when they act in bad faith. In
other words, state legislators could reject in their state liability scheme
the Supreme Court’s decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which eliminated
the “subjective intent” standard for qualified immunity.69
Such state-law reform legislation could be phrased in the following
way:
State law is amended by adding the following provision: “A
person shall not be entitled to a qualified immunity from civil
liability under this section if the person—
a.

knew or reasonably should have known that the
conduct at issue would cause a deprivation of clearly
established rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, or

b. committed the conduct with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of the rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”

The first provision captures the U.S. Supreme Court’s current
“objective intent” approach to qualified immunity. The second
provision goes beyond the current approach to reinstate a more
plaintiff-friendly “subjective intent” exception to qualified immunity,
which the Harlow Court eliminated.70
The Harlow Court eliminated the “subjective intent” exception to
qualified immunity because it was concerned that the ease of pleading
subjective intent went against the immunity’s purpose of shielding state
actors from not just monetary liability but also from the costs of
defending the lawsuit—i.e., that “insubstantial claims should not

68. See generally Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 263–93.
69. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982) (analyzing the difficulties of having
a subjective requirement and limiting liability to violations of “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).
70. Id. at 815–17 (rejecting the previously recognized “subjective intent” prong of qualified,
which eliminated qualified immunity if the officer “took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury” even if the action was objectively
reasonable (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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proceed to trial.”71 In the years since Harlow, this concern may have
been mitigated somewhat at the federal level by the Court’s decisions
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that
a plaintiff must not just plead specific factual details that establish that
the alleged conduct is “conceivable”; the conduct must actually be
“plausible.”72 We further discuss pleading standards in Part III.A,
including how states can experiment there as well.
At least two states have already adopted this approach under state
law. In 1988, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted “official
immunity” under Minnesota law to be distinct from federal qualified
immunity, holding that “subjective intent” still matters.73 And more
recently, in 2018, the Iowa Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion
on state qualified immunity that rejected Harlow:
As we have noted, a number of states allow Harlow immunity
for direct constitutional claims. In those jurisdictions, there
cannot be liability unless the defendant violated “clearly
established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow examines objective
reasonableness; thus, in some ways it resembles an immunity
for officials who act with due care. However, it is centered on,
and in our view gives undue weight to, one factor: how clear
the underlying constitutional law was. Normally we think of
due care or objective good faith as more nuanced and
reflecting several considerations. Factual good faith may
compensate for a legal error, and factual bad faith may
override some lack of clarity in the law.74

Relying on John Jeffries’s critique of Harlow, the Iowa Supreme
Court concluded that “to be entitled to [state] qualified immunity a
defendant must plead and prove as an affirmative defense that she or

71. See id. at 815–16 (explaining that subjective intent “has proved incompatible with [the
Court’s] admonition” in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, and that “it now is clear that substantial
costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials”); see also id. at 817
(“Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and
the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional colleagues.”).
72. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 108 (Minn. 1991) (refusing to incorporate federal
qualified immunity’s objective reasonableness standard as set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982)); see also Elwood v. Cnty. of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988)
(“We have previously recognized the distinction between state and federal standards of official
immunity.”).
74. Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259, 279 (Iowa 2018) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
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he exercised all due care to comply with the law.”75
Since then, former Texas Solicitor General Scott Keller has
suggested that a return to the subjective intent standard for qualified
immunity would be more consistent with first principles and the
common law immunities that existed in the 1800s when Congress first
enacted Section 1983.76
3. Codify Hope v. Pelzer Standard
A final, narrower reform could focus on how the U.S. Supreme
Court has defined what is required for law to be “clearly established”
under its current “objective intent” approach to qualified immunity.
Much criticism has been raised against the Court’s current approach,
which requires binding judicial precedent that is directly on point in
order create “clearly established” law.77 Justice Stevens advanced this
criticism in his opinion for the Court in Hope v. Pelzer, suggesting that
it suffices if existing binding precedent articulates general principles
which provide fair notice to state actors that their conduct would be
unlawful.78
State legislatures could codify this Hope standard for qualified
immunity under state law, perhaps along the following lines:
State law is amended by adding the following provision: ‘‘A
person shall not be entitled to a qualified immunity from civil
liability under this section unless the person lacked fair notice
that their conduct was unlawful at the time it was committed.
Fair notice does not necessarily require a binding precedent by
the Supreme Court or the relevant U.S. Court of Appeals that
is based on fundamentally or materially similar facts. A general

75. Id. at 280–81 (citing John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99
VA. L. REV. 207, 242, 258–60 (2013)).
76. Keller, supra note 34, at 1378 (identifying “Harlow v. Fitzgerald’s replacement of the
subjective good-faith defense with the clearly-established-law test” as “the qualified immunity
doctrine’s largest divergence from the common law”). Cf. William Baude, Is Quasi-Judicial
Immunity Qualified Immunity?, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3746068 (agreeing that Harlow is inconsistent with backdrop common
law yet criticizing Keller’s article on other grounds).
77. See, e.g., Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219,
1246–48 (2015).
78. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–42 (2002) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
that Harlow v. Fitzgerald required “the facts of previous cases be materially similar” to the facts
in the case at hand and that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established
law even in novel factual circumstances” (internal citations omitted)).
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constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may
apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question,
even though the specific action in question has not previously
been held unlawful.”

This reform would codify Justice Stevens’s approach to qualified
immunity in Hope, which recognized that some conduct is so obviously
unconstitutional that no earlier case on point is necessary. Indeed,
much of this language is lifted directly from Stevens’s opinion.79
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has recently expressed
some willingness to more robustly enforce Hope’s more plaintifffriendly approach to determine what is clearly established law for
qualified immunity purposes. In Taylor v. Riojas, a per curiam opinion
summarily reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Court cited Hope’s “fair
warning” standard that “a general constitutional rule already identified
in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct in question.”80 Several months later, the Court granted,
vacated, and remanded another case to the Fifth Circuit in light of
Taylor v. Riojas.81 Accordingly, federal legislative reform may end up
being unnecessary to codify Hope—time will tell—but codifying Hope
remains an option for state legislatures to consider.
III. EXPLORING FURTHER STATE EXPERIMENTATION
Once one recognizes the role states can play in civil-rights litigation,
other grounds for experimentation emerge. Part III addresses three
areas of the law related to qualified immunity where a 51 imperfect
solutions approach may be fruitful: (A) pleading standards; (B) antistagnation rules; and (C) appellate review. Similar to the legislative
proposals detailed in Part II, this list is illustrative, not exhaustive. We
also do not assess the policy implications of these changes, but simply
identify them to illustrate that it can be myopic to focus only on federal
law and federal courts.
A. Pleading Standards
Qualified immunity is not the only feature of federal law that critics
say disadvantages civil-rights plaintiffs. Many commentators argue that
the pleading standards used in federal court also make it unduly
79. See id. at 739–41.
80. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
81. McCoy v. Alamu, 141 S. Ct. 1364, 1364 (2021).
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difficult for plaintiffs to prevail generally—a dynamic that may
compound the effects of qualified immunity. Indeed, the late-Judge
Stephen Reinhardt lamented that the Supreme Court was “rolling back
individual rights and limiting access to the courts” by “imposing
pleading standards that essentially require plaintiffs to prove major
elements of their cases without the benefit of discovery.”82
Before the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,83 federal courts used a form of “notice” pleading known as
the “Conley standard” from a 1957 decision, in which courts were
generally required to accept as true any facts alleged in the complaint.84
In Twombly, however, the Court reversed course, holding in the context
of price-fixing that the Conley standard should give way to a
“plausibility” standard, under which a plaintiff must file “a complaint
with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made” by offering “plausible grounds to infer an agreement.”85
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal extended the
plausibility standard to civil-rights litigation.86 Now, to withstand a
motion to dismiss and obtain discovery, a civil-rights plaintiff must meet
a higher standard: “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”87
The result of this shift away from Conley, some fear, is that
meritorious claims now more often go without remedy.88 Others
82. Reinhardt, supra note 77, at 1222 n.10.
83. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
84. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).
85. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
86. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Though Twombly determined the
sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and
application of Rule 8. . . . That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts.’”); see also id. at 666 (explaining that the case
concerned allegedly discriminatory detention practices).
87. Id. at 678.
88. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA.
L. REV. 2117, 2122 (2015) (arguing that “individuals have fared poorly under the plausibility
regime, at least when compared to corporate and governmental agents and entities”); see also
John M. Greabe, Iqbal, Al-Kidd and Pleading Past Qualified Immunity: What the Cases Mean and
How They Demonstrate a Need to Eliminate the Immunity Doctrines from Constitutional Tort
Law, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1(2011) (“For, if qualified immunity is to remain an
affirmative defense, the only way to accomplish the pleadings-based dismissals that the Court
desires is to require plaintiffs to plead facts establishing the inapplicability of qualified immunity.
And this is heightened pleading.”); Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial
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disagree.89 And still others argue that the law should adopt more
targeted approaches to pleading that focuses on discovery-cost
asymmetries.90
We do not know which position is correct, if any of them are. Even
leaving aside the fog of uncertainty about how litigation works in the
real world, the optimal pleading standard must balance the risk that
meritorious claims will be incorrectly dismissed against the risk that
unmeritorious claims will succeed, for instance, by generating a
settlement. This balance also has no perfect solution; any rule will
produce unfairness. And how we think about that unfairness may
depend on what type of claim is before the court.
Thus, this is another area where a 51 imperfect solutions approach
is worth considering. States, after all, are free to reject the Iqbal
pleading standard—as many have done.91 But states are also free to
reject Iqbal on a less categorical basis. The federal approach is generally
transsubstantive—the same procedural rules and pleading standards
apply to all types of claims.92 But the states can strike a different
balance. For civil-rights claims, a state could very well decide to use

Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 901, 920–21 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal and Pearson’s version of
qualified immunity harm civil rights plaintiffs).
89. See, e.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL vii (2011) (finding “no increase in the rate of grants of motions
to dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment discrimination cases”); see
David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 136–37 (2010) (arguing that some
courts overread Iqbal because the Supreme “Court neither overturned its prior precedent nor
decided Iqbal in a manner that properly may be understood to mandate an additional burden on
plaintiffs at the pleadings”).
90. See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1633, 1679 (2017) (“Commentators do not tend to stay on the fence when it comes to the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on civil pleading standards. An overwhelming majority seem to prefer the
Court’s old ‘no set of facts’ standard as articulated in Conley v. Gibson, while a much smaller
minority prefers the new ‘plausibility pleading’ approach articulated in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Both groups are wrong.” (footnotes omitted)).
91. See, e.g., Joseph W. Owen, Note, A ‘Plausible’ Future: Some State Courts Embrace
Heightened Pleading After Twombly and Iqbal, 36 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 104, 104 (2013) (explaining
that some but not all states have followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead); Mark W. Payne, The
Post-Iqbal State of Pleading: An Argument Opposing a Uniform National Pleading Regime, 20 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 245, 262–63 (2012) ( describing how although certain states have adopted
Iqbal, other states have denied to adopt the standard); see also, e.g., Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955
A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008) (explaining that state courts “are in no way bound by federal
jurisprudence in interpreting our state pleading rules”).
92. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and
discrimination suits alike.”) (citations omitted); Stancil, supra note 90, at 1680 (“[T]he real
problem with pleading law is not Twombly, Iqbal, or Conley. Instead, it is the transsubstantive
application of whichever pleading standard the Supreme Court adopts.”).
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notice pleading or change the burden of proof necessary for an
affirmative defense like qualified immunity. To be clear, these such
reforms may have downsides. This Essay does not consider the
substantive merits of these ideas. But for those concerned about
pleading standards, there are paths to reform other than through the
federal system.
B. Anti-Stagnation Rules
The debate over constitutional stagnation is another fertile ground
for state-by-state experimentation.93 If states dislike the U.S. Supreme
Court’s current approach to the procedural sequence in which qualified
immunity cases are resolved, legislatures can create their own antistagnation rules.
Some background may be helpful. At its core, qualified immunity is
substantively controversial because it prevents plaintiffs from
recovering damages. But it is also procedurally controversial. In
particular, qualified immunity’s two-part test (whether the right was
violated, and if so, whether the right was clearly established) may
exacerbate legal uncertainty. Rather than deciding whether the
constitutional right actually exists, a judge can simply dismiss a claim
by observing that whether or not the right exists, that right was not
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. In fact, judges
often resolve claims without ever deciding whether the alleged right
was violated.94
The fear is that if judges rely on this method often enough, some
rights may never be clearly established, especially for new technologies
or rights that cannot be recognized through other judicial channels.95
To address this risk, the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz required
federal courts to always first address whether the right exists, and if so,

93. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2015) (describing how the risk of constitutional stagnation has been
studied empirically).
94. See, e.g., id. at 37 (“The overall rate of reaching constitutional questions accordingly has
decreased after Pearson; it would be shocking if it were otherwise.”).
95. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“Qualified immunity, however, is more than just substantively
contested; it also is procedurally problematic. Because a plaintiff must satisfy both parts of the
test, a court often could dismiss a civil rights suit without reaching the merits of the constitutional
claim. This is particularly true for situations involving new technologies, like Tasers, or new
factual or political settings. After all, it is difficult to find ‘clearly established’ law in cases of first
impression.”). As explained above, there are limits to this; an earlier case is not always required
where it is obvious that conduct is unconstitutional. See Part II.C.3 supra (discussing Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
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only then consider whether that right was clearly established.96 This
rigid order-of-operations requirement, however, was short lived.
Following widespread discontent from judges who chafed at being told
how to resolve cases (including poorly briefed ones), the Court
unanimously overruled Saucier in Pearson v. Callahan.97 Now, judges
have discretion whether to address the constitutional question first or,
if the right is not clearly established, to simply dismiss the claim.98
Pearson is controversial.99 Some commentators believe that
Pearson should be rejected because it causes too much stagnation.100 Is
that right? Unfortunately, it is hard to say. Although stagnation fears
may be overstated,101 it is difficult to make definitive conclusions—
especially because the “right” answer is not entirely empirical. The
threat of constitutional stagnation thus presents another situation
where a 51 imperfect solutions approach makes sense. As a matter of
state law, a state could re-impose a procedural rule like Saucier, at least
for certain types of claims—for example, claims involving new

96. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the
qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated
a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry. . . . [I]f a violation could be made out on a
favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established.” (citations omitted)).
97. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“On reconsidering the procedure
required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it
should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”).
98. See id. at 236 (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.”).
99. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1613 (2011) (“The decisional
sequencing mandated in Saucier v. Katz and moderated in Pearson v. Callahan remains
controversial among scholars who continue to debate how well it has achieved its goal.”). We
have explored elsewhere how Pearson has also increased incentives for strategic judicial
decisionmaking in the federal courts of appeals. See generally Aaron Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55 (2016).
100. See, e.g., Hannah Beard, Note, How Ziglar v. Abbasi Sheds Light on Qualified-Immunity
Doctrine, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 883, 890 (2019) (arguing that “[t]he risk of constitutional
stagnation is more significant than the Pearson Court anticipated”); Karen M. Blum, Qualified
Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1887, 1893 (2018) (“Since the
Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan released lower federal courts from the ‘rigid order of
battle’ demanded by Saucier v. Katz . . . , most courts have been happy to forgo diving into tough
constitutional questions when prong two has presented an obvious escape route.” (footnotes
omitted)).
101. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Defending Qualified Immunity, 72 S.C. L. REV. 547, 610
(2020) (suggesting data indicates that “Pearson has hardly prevented the courts from articulating
constitutional doctrine” (citing Nielson & Walker, supra note 93, at 34–38)).
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technologies or situations where the constitutional question is unlikely
to arise often through other means (like the exclusionary rule).102 Or,
at the very least, as we have argued elsewhere, judges could be required
to provide reasons for exercising (or not) their Pearson decision to
reach constitutional questions that are not clearly established by
existing precedent.103
Some of these reforms could be complete disasters; some could
work across the board; and still others could prove to be disasters for
some states but effective solutions for others. Our point again is simply
that state-led reform is possible. If states can create their own causes of
action that mirror Section 1983, with their own potential defenses, then
there is no reason why they cannot also create their own anti-stagnation
rules.104
C. Appellate Review
Appellate review is also a place for potential experimentation. In
the federal system, when a court rejects a qualified immunity defense,
the official can often seek interlocutory appeal rather than having to
wait for a final judgment.105 According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
because qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability,” there is immediate appellate jurisdiction
under the collateral order doctrine.106 Indeed, the Justices have
“repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity

102. From the other direction, a state could decide that other ways to establish rights are
adequate, such that where an alleged right is not clearly established, a court should never decide
whether the right exists—an approach suggested by Justice Kennedy to prevent anomalous
appellate situations. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “the Court might find it necessary to reconsider its special permission that the courts
of appeals may issue unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with binding
precedential effect”).
103. Nielson & Walker, supra note 93, at 52 (arguing for the “middle path” of qualified
immunity procedural reform that “the [Supreme] Court should require lower courts—both trial
and appellate courts—to give reasons for exercising (or not) their Pearson discretion to reach
constitutional questions”); accord Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional
Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 175 (“At a minimum, in light of the strong reasons for
reaching the constitutional merits, courts should be required to give reasons for not doing so.”).
104. Such reforms may require amending state constitutions—a question beyond the scope
of this Essay.
105. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169 (2019) (“[F]or over thirty . . . years, the Court has made
clear that denials by district courts of . . . [a qualified immunity] defense are subject to an
immediate appeal by the defendant under the ‘collateral order doctrine,’ despite the interlocutory
nature of that trial court decision.”).
106. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis removed).
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questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”107 Some
commentators fear that interlocutory appeals may unduly delay
resolution of civil-rights cases108 and give defendants unfair leverage in
settlement discussions.109
Once again, accordingly, this is a place where a 51 imperfect
solutions approach may be worthwhile. The U.S. Supreme Court has
already held that state courts are not required to allow interlocutory
appeals in civil-rights cases involving qualified immunity in Section
1983 litigation.110 A fortiori, states could do the same when it comes to
their own causes of action. Like the other potential legislative reforms
discussed above, this appellate review reform illustrates how states in a
laboratories-of-democracy fashion are free to experiment with new
approaches if they believe the federal approach is suboptimal.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has explained that “[q]ualified immunity
strikes a balance between compensating those who have been injured
by official conduct and protecting government’s ability to perform its
traditional functions.”111 The doctrine thus attempts to balance the
“vindicat[ion]” of “citizens’ constitutional rights” against the goal of

107. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376, n. 2 (2007) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991)).
108. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 100, at 1916–17 (“Interlocutory appeals are inefficient,
expensive, and often without merit.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection
Effects, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1105–06 (2020) (“Qualified immunity motions and interlocutory
appeals of qualified immunity denials also result in delays—of months or years—while the
motions are pending. These delays can increase the cost of preparing for trial, and can weaken a
plaintiff’s case if witnesses’ recollections of the underlying facts get hazier over time.” (footnotes
omitted)); Solimine, supra note 105, at 175 (“[A]n interlocutory appeal can disrupt trial
proceedings and cause delay and increased costs for the litigants.”).
109. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Procedure: ADR and the Justices’ “Second Wave”
Constriction of Court Access and Claim Development, 70 SMU L. REV. 765, 779 (2017) (asserting
the Supreme Court has “also orchestrated a radical transformation of summary judgment
standards in qualified immunity civil rights damage cases and significantly expanded interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction—markedly expanding defendants’ summary adjudication prospects and
litigation leverage while eroding plaintiffs’ path to trial on the merits (or settlement)” (footnotes
omitted)).
110. See Johnson v. Fanknell, 520 U.S. 911, 922–23 (1997) (“This respect [for the States] is at
its apex when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to undertake something as
fundamental as restructuring the operation of its courts. We therefore cannot agree . . . that
§ 1983’s recognition of the defense of qualified immunity pre-empts a State’s consistent
application of its neutral procedural rules, even when those rules deny an interlocutory appeal in
this context.” (footnotes omitted)).
111. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
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protecting “public officials’ effective performance of their duties.”112
Given the difficulty of that task, no one should be surprised that
qualified immunity is controversial. Unfortunately, there is no perfect
solution. Even if the public knew how often rights are violated and how
much chill legal uncertainty creates (and the resulting harm for third
parties), individuals still would not agree on the optimal policy solution.
The public, moreover, does not have such perfect knowledge. One-sizefits-all solutions rarely satisfy where deep philosophical differences
collide with immense empirical uncertainty.
So what can be done? We urge federalism as part of the path
forward. Federalism enables experimentation, which over time reduces
empirical uncertainty. And federalism also enables policy tailoring,
which allows balances that more closely match a polity’s convictions.
Of course, there should be limits on experimentation and tailoring.
Indeed, consistent with the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, we
support a high federal floor.113 At the very least, state officials who
violate clearly established law should be liable for damages.114 But with
that federal floor in place, we submit that 51 imperfect solutions are
better than a single imperfect solution.

112. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
113. Nielson & Walker, supra note 6, at 300 (explaining “many of the most important federal
rights are clearly established and, as time passes, more rights are becoming so,” meaning that “the
federal floor [beneath which states cannot experiment] can be quite high”).
114. See id. at 303 (“We do not believe that qualified immunity is perfect. It is not. Nor,
frankly, is federalism.”).

